Nehru and Somnath Temple

Himanshu Roy

Jawaharlal Nehru’s Association with the reconstruction of the Somnath Temple (November 1947-May 1951) at Dwarka in Gujarat reflects duality in his character and writings. As the Prime Minister, his cabinet had approved the proposal of its reconstruction, which was earlier announced in the public by N V Gadgil, Minister of Works, Mines, and Power, Government of India (GOI), and Vallabh Bhai Patel, Minister of Home, Information and Broadcasting and Deputy Prime Minister at Dwarka on November 13 1947.1 Later, in his reply, when invited for the Pran Pratishtha (idol installation) in 1951 after the completion of the Temple, Nehru was critical of the reconstruction and refused the invitation; he had termed it as ‘Hindu revivalism’ and questioned the association of his ‘secular government’ with such ‘religious affairs’. He had restrained the Indian ambassadors and the staff in the Ministry of Broadcasting from acting upon the earlier request of the Somnath Temple Trust, which was officially called the Somanatha Board of Trustees, of which the Chairman was Digvijaysinh Ranajitsinh Jadeja of Nawanagar commonly known as Jam Saheb who became the Rajpramukh of Saurashtra. Nehru’s response at other places, however, was conciliatory. He had written, “This could have been done gradually and more effectively later”.2 This dual and conflicting behaviour was intriguing and opportunistic. For, when Gandhi and Patel were alive, he travelled with them with the idea of reconstruction; once they had passed away Nehru changed his track. Let’s put it (Nehru’s behaviour towards the process of reconstruction) in the sequential order to understand him. For, in the Hegelian Metaphor the history repeats itself. In fact, it has repeated itself seventy-five years later. In 2024, when the Ayodhya Temple Trust (The Ramjanmbhoomi Teerthkshetra) invited the Nehrus for the Pran Pratishtha, the invitation was not accepted. Rahul Gandhi, however, visited the Temple later.

It began with Patel’s visit to Dwarka on November 13, 1947.3  It was a day after Diwali. He had earlier addressed a large crowd at the Bahauddin College’s ground at Junagadh, had sought their plebiscitary approval of integration of Junagadh with India, and then left for Dwarka. He was accompanied by N V Gadgil, Jam Saheb, V P Menon, his wife, C C Desai, joint- secretary in the Ministry of States, Vidyashankar, PS to Patel and Maniben. They had come from Delhi. Samaldas Gandhi, the President of the Arzi Hukumat (Provisional Government) of Junagadh and a relative of Mahatma Gandhi, had joined the mat Junagadh. Junagadh had joined India on November 9. At Dwarka, the team visited the ruins at the entrance of the Temple, Gadgil, in the presence of the local residents, who had joined in large numbers after hearing the arrival of Patel and Jam Saheb, announced the reconstruction of the Temple by the GOI. The idea of reconstruction had struck him earlier in Delhi and at Dwarka beach, for which he had sought the approval of Patel. Once again, Patel announced the reconstruction of the Somnath Temple at the nearby Ahilyabai Holkar Temple, where the team visited it later. Patel had called it ‘a holy task in which all should participate’.4

Jam Saheb and Samaldas Gandhi announced that they would contribute a sum of one lakh rupees and fifty-one thousand rupees, respectively.5 The residents cheered the announcement of reconstruction of Somnath slogan. It was the New Year’s Day of Samvat 2004.

After coming back to Delhi, Patel appraised Mahatma Gandhi about the development at Junagadh and Dwarka. The meeting took place sixteen days after the announcement. In the meantime, the cabinet had approved the proposal. Gandhi had suggested that the GOI or the Saurashtra government should not fund the reconstruction. At best, the Government can provide technical-advisory support. Patel promised him to abide by the suggestion. The reconstruction was to be funded by public contribution. A Trust was created to manage the affairs.6 The GOI also created an Advisory Committee headed by KM Munshi. The idea of reconstruction took off. Patel, Gadgil, and later on, KM Munshi were the earlier initiators, founders, and guides.

In the Trust, Jam Saheb and Samadas Gandhi, the two representatives of the Saurashtra government were nominated by Patel. Gadgil represented GOI, B M Birla and K.M Munshi represented the public. In the advisory committee which was formed to assist the Trust, the Town Planning officer, the Central Public Works Department (CPWD), the Director General of Archaeology, the Chief-Engineer of Saurashtra Government, and the two architects–C M Master and Prabh-shankar–who were experts in the temple design was co-opted into. The objective of the Trust was ‘not only the rebuilding’ and maintenance of the Somnath Temple and auxiliary institutions but also to develop the neighbourhood.7

The initial idea was to renovate the ruins of the existing structure. However, after a lengthy discussion among the different ministries of the GOI and the Saurashtra Government, it was agreed upon that the existing structure be pulled down, the location be shifted, and a new one be constructed. The existing ruins and its location had become unviable to withstand the renovation. The salty water and the weather had damaged the foundation in the absence of regular maintenance over the centuries. The last time it was destroyed was in the Aurangzeb’s regime. It was completely burned and gutted down. The existing ruins were pulled down on May 8, 1950, and a new structure slightly away from the old location began to be constructed from October 19, 1950. It was the day when the Temple’s foundation stone was laid down. On May 11, 1951, the President of India did the Pran Pratishtha (consecration of idol-installation) at 9.47 AM. In six months, the Temple was erected and made functional. The total construction cost of it was Rupees twenty-four lakh ninety-two thousand.

Patel was to do the Pran Pratishtha. Buton [December 15, 1950, at 9.37 AM] died in Bombay. In his absence, Nehru was invited by the Trust to complete the process. Nehru refused. In his place, Rajendra Prasad was subsequently invited. But before the invitation was sent to him his prior consent was obtained. This was the lesson learned by the Trust from the Nehru fiasco. The Trust assumed that Nehru would accept the invitation as the Government was part of the Temple reconstruction; it had the approval of Gandhi and Patel, as discussed earlier or in the past, he had never voiced his opposition. His unexpected refusal and criticism in the post-Patel months were shocking for everyone. His opposition was so ferocious that he opposed the President’s acceptance of Pran Pratishtha and asked the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting to tone down the frequency of the Temple ceremony’s broadcasting. The Indian Ambassadors posted in different countries of the world, which the Trust had earlier requested to send river water and soil of that country for the consecration as part of Vasudhaiv Kutumbkam, were now asked not to act. The Chief Ministers were informed (letters Nehru wrote on May 2, 1951) that the GOI had nothing to do with this ceremony. C Rajagopalachari and Radhakrishnan were also roped in in his opposition.

In his new avatar, Nehru mentioned three reasons(collated from his letters)for his opposition. As stated earlier, he felt that the Temple reconstruction was ‘Hindu revivalism’ associated with medievalism and Brahmanical dominance; it was anti-democratic and an attempt to create false glory and pride that may charge up and widen the religious divide. It was anti-modern. To him, the Bhakhra Nangal dam was the new modern Temple required in independent India. But he did not say the same to Gandhi and Patel when they were alive and had approved the reconstruction of the Temple. Gandhi, Patel, Gadgil, Munshi or Rajendra Prasad, while approving the reconstruction, had felt that Somnath Temple represented ‘faith in our past’ that will generate social strength to rebuild our present for, a rootless millions have no emotional texture to work. The faith will ‘alone make India an advanced and vigorous nation’, and for it, they had agreed to ‘reintegrate some aspects of Hinduism’. ‘It was a national urge’.8

Nehru’s second reason for opposition was premised on the contemporary nature of the Indian state- the secular state- which he felt was being compromised due to the reconstruction of the Temple in which the GOI was actively involved.

Nehru had remarked that a secular government cannot associate itself with this religious ceremony. It will have a bad image of the Indian state in the world. It was already being opposed by the Christians and the Muslims in India once it was known that the GOI was actively involved in the reconstruction. The Urdu press carried out the public reaction: ‘If Somnath is renovated, it will have to be avenged; a new Ghaznavi must come from Ghaznavi’. Nehru had written to the President, “I confess that I don’t like the idea of your associating with the spectacular opening of the Somnath Temple”. Rajendra Prasad replied, “Our state is neither irreligious nor anti-religious. I would do the same with a Mosque or Church if I were invited”; he had, therefore, no hesitation in proceeding for the Pran Pratishtha. The intriguing part of Nehru was that he kept mum throughout the reconstruction process. Only when the Temple was complete did he feel that the nature of the Indian secular state was being compromised, and his opposition began.

Nehru’s third reason was his feeling that ‘the public’s money, resources, time, and energy and the GOI spent on the reconstruction were wasteful expenditures and wrong priorities in the face of’ intense poverty and hunger’.It was ‘no time to lay stress on large-scale building operations at Somnath’.9 ‘He had felt that the resources could have been better utilised for modern objectives as religion to him was anti-progressive. His interpretation of popular religion and its everyday praxis was confined to being a bunch of rituals, a cesspool, stagnancy, and visionless of Hinduism. He had not imagined that the temple reconstruction would boost the local economy, employment, and general improvement in the neighbourhood, along with a boost in history research through Sanskrit education. The opposition to the reconstruction was unimpactful in minimising the religiosity among the citizens. An absence of a temple does not minimise religiosity. But its presence boosts the local economy and social life. He represented modernity,10 which was Western and elitist, and believed and argued that social rationality, progress, and techno-economic development could be actuated through non-religious praxis. He represented a perspective that was elitist and non-Indic. It was equally ahistorical. He attempted to mobilise the masses to gel with his views. For most citizens, however, religious praxis and symbols were the heart, spirit, and source of sustenance that K M Munshi was stating, as referred to earlier.

Nehru, being a politician, was more concerned about his international image and domestic politics, particularly in the Arab and Western world and among the Muslims in India. Patel had forewarned him from formulating policies under their influence11 or the influence of the local feudal Ashraf Muslim, the traditional elite. Israel was not being recognised despite prodding by Patel.

Nehru knew the role of the Ashraf in India’s partition, yet he had not learned the lesson. He changed his stance towards the reconstruction of Somnath Temple after Patel’s death was more opportunistic. Had it been an ideological commitment, he could have stated such words earlier what he wrote later, after Patel’s death. His modernity was not organic. Gandhi and Patel were better rooted. Both of them had attempted earlier to be anglicised in their early non-political lives, but fortunately, they returned to their Indian roots once they entered politics. Both of them, therefore, had approved the reconstruction of the Temple.

References:
1    N V Gadgil, Government from Inside, Meenakshi Prakashan, Meerut, 1968, pp. 59-60; K M Munshi, Somnath, Bhartiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 1952, pp. 60-61.
2    Ramachandra Guha, India After Gandhi Picador, London, 2007, pp.131-132.
3    Munshi, op. cit.
4    Cited in ibid.
5    Ibid.
6    Ibid., p.65.
7    Ibid. p.70.
8    Ibid. p.77.
9    Guha. op.cit.,p.131.
10    Himanshu Roy and M P Singh (eds.), Indian Political Thought, Pearson, New Delhi, Chap.25
11    Shakti Sinhaand Himanshu Roy (eds.), Patel: Political Ideas and Policies, Sage, 2019, New Delhi, pp. VIII-IX

[Himanshu Roy, Professor, Centre for Political Studies, JNU]

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